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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
A plaintiff who files suit in federal court may face 
significant difficulties when jurisdiction is premised on 
diversity and the defendant is an unincorporated association 
such as a partnership or limited liability company (“LLC”). 
The members of the association determine its citizenship, but 
these members may be unknown to the plaintiff even after a 
diligent pre-filing investigation. The plaintiff may tentatively 
assert that complete diversity exists, but whether this 
assertion survives a motion to dismiss depends entirely on the 
pleading standard that the court chooses to apply. We hold 
that a plaintiff need not affirmatively allege the citizenship of 
each member of an unincorporated association in order to get 
past the pleading stage. Instead, if the plaintiff is able to 
allege in good faith, after a reasonable attempt to determine 
the identities of the members of the association, that it is 
diverse from all of those members, its complaint will survive 
a facial challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. If the 
defendant thereafter mounts a factual challenge, the plaintiff 
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is entitled to limited discovery for the purpose of establishing 
that complete diversity exists.  
I. Background 
 
 Lincoln Benefit Life Company filed a federal 
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment voiding two $6.65 
million life insurance policies. Lincoln Benefit alleges that 
these policies were procured by fraud and for the benefit of 
third-party investors who have no prior relationship to the 
individual whose life is the subject of the policies. According 
to the complaint, this sort of “stranger originated life 
insurance” or “STOLI” scheme generally violates state 
insurable-interest laws and the public policy against wagering 
on human life.  
 
 The defendants identified in Lincoln Benefit’s 
complaint included a corporation named Innovative Brokers, 
which was involved in the procurement of the policies, and 
two LLCs that were the record owners and beneficiaries of 
the policies: AEI Life, LLC and ALS Capital Ventures, LLC.  
 
 Federal subject-matter jurisdiction was premised on 
diversity of citizenship. Accordingly, Lincoln Benefit 
included the following allegations in its complaint: 
 
7. Plaintiff Lincoln Benefit is a citizen of the 
State of Nebraska. Lincoln Benefit is a life 
insurance company organized and existing 
under the laws of Nebraska, with its principal 
place of business at 2940 South 84th Street, 
Lincoln, NE 68506.  
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8. Upon information and belief, Defendant AEI 
Life, LLC is a citizen of and is domiciled in 
New York, and Defendant AEI Life, LLC 
maintains its principal address at 1428 36th 
Street, Ste. 219, Brooklyn, New York 11218. 
Defendant AEI Life, LLC is the record owner 
of Policy No. 01N1404934.  
9. Upon information and belief, Defendant ALS 
Capital Ventures, LLC is a citizen of and 
domiciled in the State of Delaware. Defendant 
ALS Capital Ventures is the record owner of 
Policy No. 01N1404844.1 
 The defendants filed motions to dismiss for, among 
other things, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Their primary 
argument was that Lincoln Benefit had failed to adequately 
plead diversity jurisdiction: an LLC’s citizenship is 
determined by the citizenship of its members, and Lincoln 
Benefit had not alleged the citizenship of the members of the 
LLC defendants.  
 
 In response, Lincoln Benefit pointed out that none of 
the defendants had asserted that it was a citizen of Nebraska. 
It further argued that because “information concerning the 
citizenship of the members of the defendant-LLCs is not 
available to Lincoln Benefit,” it should not be required to 
plead that information with specificity.2 Lincoln Benefit’s 
                                              
1 (App. Vol. II at 2-3.) 
2 (Resp. to Innovative Broker’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 26 
at 7.) All ECF citations refer to the District Court’s docket. 
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counsel responded that it “was unable to discern the identity 
and/or citizenship of Defendant AEI Life, LLC and 
Defendant ALS Capital Ventures, LLC. Counsel for Lincoln 
Benefit searched public databases, civil dockets, and various 
business-related search engines, including the New York 
Secretary of State website.”3 Lincoln Benefit reiterated, 
however, that “based on publicly available information, none 
of the defendants is a citizen of Nebraska.”4  
 
 In support of this allegation, Lincoln Benefit provided 
the District Court with certain documents it had consulted. 
The New York Department of State record for AEI Life, LLC 
indicated that it was organized in New York, and the only 
addresses and business associates listed were located in New 
York. Similarly, the Delaware Secretary of State record for 
ALS Capital Ventures, LLC indicated connections only to 
Delaware. Lincoln Benefit explained that because it “did not 
have first-hand knowledge of the information supporting the 
citizenship designations (i.e., its allegations were based on 
public records), Lincoln Benefit prefaced its allegations ‘upon 
information and belief.’”5 It contended that in light of the 
above, it had adequately pleaded diversity. In the alternative, 
it requested leave for limited jurisdictional discovery. 
                                                                                                     
The docket number assigned by the District of New Jersey to 
this action is 3:13-cv-04117. 
3 (Aff. of Katherine Villanueva, ECF No. 26-1 at 2 ¶ 6.) 
4 (Resp. to AEI Life, LLC’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 34 at 
2.) 
5 (Id. at 5.) 
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 The District Court granted the defendants’ motions in 
part and dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. Citing Johnson v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp.,6 it held that Lincoln Benefit was required to 
allege the citizenship of each member of each defendant LLC 
in order to plead complete diversity. In addition, it denied the 
request for jurisdictional discovery, reasoning that it would 
waste judicial resources and amount to an impermissible 
exercise of jurisdiction to order discovery when the plaintiff 
had not adequately alleged jurisdiction in the first place.  
 
 On appeal, Lincoln Benefit maintains that its 
jurisdictional allegations were sufficient and that the District 
Court erroneously imposed a heightened pleading standard. 
Only Innovative Brokers filed a brief defending the District 
Court’s decision; neither the LLCs nor any other defendant 
has chosen to participate in this appeal.7 
II. Discussion 
 
A. General Principles of Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
 “The principal federal statute governing diversity 
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, gives federal district courts 
                                              
6 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013). 
7 “We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and our 
review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.” 
Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 180 (3d Cir. 
2008).  
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original jurisdiction of all civil actions ‘between . . . citizens 
of different States’ where the amount in controversy exceeds 
$75,000.”8 For over two hundred years, the statute has been 
understood as requiring “complete diversity between all 
plaintiffs and all defendants,” even though only minimal 
diversity is constitutionally required.9 This means that, unless 
there is some other basis for jurisdiction, “no plaintiff [may] 
be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”10  
 
 “Most rules of citizenship are well established. A 
natural person is deemed to be a citizen of the state where he 
is domiciled. A corporation is a citizen both of the state where 
it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal 
place of business.”11 But unlike corporations, unincorporated 
associations such as partnerships “are not considered 
‘citizens’ as that term is used in the diversity statute.”12 
Instead, “the citizenship of partnerships and other 
                                              
8 Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) 
(alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332). 
9 Id. Although challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction may 
be raised at any time, whether diversity exists is determined 
by the citizenship of the parties at the time the action is filed. 
See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 
570-71 (2004). 
10 Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 
(3d Cir. 2010).  
11 Id. (citations omitted). 
12 Swiger, 540 F.3d at 182 (citing Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 
494 U.S. 185, 187-92 (1990)). 
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unincorporated associations is determined by the citizenship 
of [their] partners or members.”13 The state of organization 
and the principal place of business of an unincorporated 
association are legally irrelevant.14 “Accordingly, the 
citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of its 
members.”15 For complete diversity to exist, all of the LLC’s 
members “must be diverse from all parties on the opposing 
side.”16  
 
                                              
13 Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420; see also Emerald Investors 
Trust v. Gaunt Parsippany Partners, 492 F.3d 192, 200 (3d 
Cir. 2007). The “one exception” identified by the Supreme 
Court is “the entity known as a sociedad en comandita, 
created under the civil law of Puerto Rico, [which is] treated 
as a citizen of Puerto Rico for purposes of determining 
federal-court jurisdiction.” Carden, 494 U.S. at 189-90.  
14 See Carden, 494 U.S. at 192; Johnson, 724 F.3d at 348. 
15 Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420; see also Johnson, 724 F.3d at 
348. 
16 Swiger, 540 F.3d at 185. Depending on the membership 
structure of the LLC, this inquiry can become quite 
complicated. “[A]s with partnerships, where an LLC has, as 
one of its members, another LLC, ‘the citizenship of 
unincorporated associations must be traced through however 
many layers of partners or members there may be’ to 
determine the citizenship of the LLC.” Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 
420 (quoting Hart v. Terminex Int’l, 336 F.3d 541, 543 (7th 
Cir. 2003)). 
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B. Challenges to Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests 
with the party asserting its existence.17 “Challenges to subject 
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may be facial or 
factual.”18 A facial attack “concerns ‘an alleged pleading 
deficiency’ whereas a factual attack concerns ‘the actual 
failure of [a plaintiff’s] claims to comport [factually] with the 
jurisdictional prerequisites.’”19  
 
 “In reviewing a facial attack, the court must only 
consider the allegations of the complaint and documents 
referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.”20 By contrast, in reviewing a 
factual attack, “the court must permit the plaintiff to respond 
with rebuttal evidence in support of jurisdiction, and the court 
then decides the jurisdictional issue by weighing the 
                                              
17 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 
(2006). 
18 Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
19 CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(alterations in original) (quoting United States ex rel. 
Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 
2007)). 
20 Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
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evidence. If there is a dispute of a material fact, the court 
must conduct a plenary hearing on the contested issues prior 
to determining jurisdiction.”21  
 
 If the defendants here had challenged the factual 
existence of jurisdiction, Lincoln Benefit would have been 
required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, after 
discovery, that it was diverse from every member of both 
defendant LLCs. Instead, however, the defendants mounted a 
facial challenge to the adequacy of the jurisdictional 
allegations in Lincoln Benefit’s complaint. We therefore turn 
to the pleading requirements for diversity jurisdiction. 
 
C. Pleading Diversity Jurisdiction 
 
 The District Court held that Lincoln Benefit was 
required to “plead the citizenship of each member of the 
defendant LLCs and allege that these citizenships differ from 
that of [Lincoln Benefit].”22 Although it cited Johnson v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp.23 for this proposition, Johnson 
involved a factual challenge to diversity jurisdiction and did 
not address pleading requirements.  
 
 The requirement that a plaintiff plead the basis for 
federal jurisdiction appears in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(1), which requires the complaint to provide “a 
                                              
21 McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 290 
(3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
22 (App. Vol. I at 16.) 
23 724 F.3d 337. 
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short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 
jurisdiction.” Beyond stating that the jurisdictional allegations 
should be “short and plain,” the Rule does not specify the 
level of detail required to adequately plead the “grounds” for 
federal jurisdiction. There are, however, a number of other 
guideposts that we may consult in deciding the issue.24  
 
 The Appendix to the Rules contains forms that “suffice 
under the[] rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that 
the[] rules contemplate.”25 Form 7, entitled “Statement of 
                                              
24 Supreme Court cases predating the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure suggest that a plaintiff must affirmatively plead the 
citizenship of each member of an unincorporated association. 
See Thomas v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 195 U.S. 207, 
217-18 (1904); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 
U.S. 449, 458 (1900); Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 
681-82 (1889). But the case before us requires us to construe 
Rule 8, which represented a significant departure from the 
stringent pleading requirements that preceded it. See Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573-76 (2007) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-
14 (2002).  
25 Fed. R. Civ. P. 84; see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 
n.4. On April 29, 2015, the Supreme Court submitted to 
Congress its Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which abrogate Rule 84 and the 
accompanying forms. Absent contrary congressional action, 
these Proposed Amendments will go into effect on December 
1, 2015. Given that the forms are currently in effect, we find 
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Jurisdiction,” contains sample allegations that establish 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.26 According to these 
samples, a plaintiff may simply allege that a party is a 
“citizen of [a certain state].”27 In the case of a corporation, the 
state of incorporation and principal place of business should 
be alleged, as the corporation is a citizen of both states.28 
Form 7 does not, however, show how to plead the citizenship 
of an unincorporated association. It would certainly be 
enough to list the states of citizenship of each member of the 
unincorporated association; even the most convoluted 
association is, at bottom, made up of natural persons and/or 
corporations, for which bare allegations of citizenship suffice. 
But Form 7 does not indicate that such a list is required. 
 
 Our precedent is more instructive, as we have 
previously held that a plaintiff may plead diversity 
jurisdiction without making affirmative allegations of 
citizenship. In Lewis v. Rego Co.,29 all of the plaintiffs were 
Pennsylvania citizens. Three of four defendants filed a 
removal petition, as the fourth had not yet entered an 
appearance. The petition affirmatively stated the citizenship 
of the three defendants who had entered an appearance. In 
addition, on the basis of information obtained from the fourth 
                                                                                                     
it useful to consider them, but we do not rely on them in 
reaching our ultimate conclusion. 
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 7. 
27 Id. 
28 See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
29 757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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defendant, the petition alleged “on information and belief” 
that the fourth defendant was not a citizen of Pennsylvania. 
We held that these allegations sufficed to establish diversity.30  
 
 Thus, rather than affirmatively alleging the citizenship 
of a defendant, a plaintiff may allege that the defendant is not 
a citizen of the plaintiff’s state of citizenship.31 Permitting 
                                              
30 See id. at 68-69. The fact that this was a removal case 
makes no difference, as the relevant language of the removal 
statute tracks the language of Rule 8(a). See Dart Cherokee 
Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 553 
(2014) (noting that both 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) and Rule 8(a) 
require “a short and plain statement of the grounds” for 
federal jurisdiction); Lewis, 757 F.2d at 68 (noting that the 
version of § 1446(a) then in force required “a short and plain 
statement of the facts which entitled [the defendant] to 
removal”).  
31 In a later case, we noted that “in a diversity action, the 
plaintiff must state all parties’ citizenships such that the 
existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.” Chem. 
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 
210, 222 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999). Because we did not confront the 
situation presented in Lewis, however, this broad statement 
cannot be interpreted as implicitly overruling that decision, 
even if that were possible. See United States v. Joseph, 730 
F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that normally we 
follow the earlier of conflicting decisions).  
 Separately, we note that in Lewis we deemed it 
permissible to make allegations of citizenship “on 
information and belief.” The motions to dismiss Lincoln 
Benefit’s complaint argued that these sorts of qualified 
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this sort of negative allegation makes good sense. The fact 
that the plaintiff and defendant do not share a state of 
citizenship usually establishes diversity.32 Consequently, it 
serves little purpose to require the plaintiff to allege the 
defendant’s precise state of citizenship, especially when this 
would entail a difficult factual investigation prior to filing.33  
 
 We see no reason why Lewis should not apply in the 
context of unincorporated associations. A State X plaintiff 
                                                                                                     
allegations were insufficient. As Innovative Brokers does not 
renew this argument on appeal, we need not address it. 
Several Courts of Appeals accept allegations “on information 
and belief” when the facts at issue are peculiarly within the 
defendant’s possession. See Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team 
Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014); Pirelli 
Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. 
Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 442-43 (7th Cir. 2011); Medical 
Assur. Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371 (7th Cir. 2010); Arista 
Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). As 
Lincoln Benefit argues, and Innovative Brokers concedes, 
information regarding the membership of the defendant LLCs 
is uniquely within their possession. 
32 If, however, the other party is an American citizen 
domiciled abroad, he or she is “stateless” for purposes of the 
diversity statute and cannot be sued in federal court based on 
diversity jurisdiction. See Swiger, 540 F.3d at 184.  
33 Cf. 5 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 1208 (3d ed., 
updated 2013) (making a similar argument with respect to 
alleging the principal place of business of a corporation).  
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may therefore survive a facial challenge by alleging that none 
of the defendant association’s members are citizens of State 
X.34 Significantly, however, the plaintiff is permitted to make 
such an allegation even if it is not certain of the association’s 
membership. In order to satisfy its obligations under Rule 11, 
a party must conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts 
alleged in its pleadings.35 Thus, before alleging that none of 
an unincorporated association’s members are citizens of a 
particular state, a plaintiff should consult the sources at its 
disposal, including court filings and other public records. If, 
after this inquiry, the plaintiff has no reason to believe that 
any of the association’s members share its state of citizenship, 
it may allege complete diversity in good faith. The 
unincorporated association, which is in the best position to 
ascertain its own membership, may then mount a factual 
                                              
34 To be sure, in two cases where unions were parties, we 
faulted the plaintiffs for asserting complete diversity while 
failing to identify the unions’ members and plead their 
citizenships. See Local No. 1 (ACA) Broad. Emps. of the Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of 
Am. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am., 614 F.2d 846, 853 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334, 338-39 (3d Cir. 1958). 
These cases do not govern the question presented to us, 
however, as the plaintiffs there did not make negative 
allegations of the sort we approved in Lewis or allege that 
they could not ascertain the unions’ memberships without 
discovery. 
35 See Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471, 488 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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challenge by identifying any member who destroys 
diversity.36  
 
 We believe that allowing this method of pleading 
strikes the appropriate balance between facilitating access to 
the courts and managing the burdens of discovery. District 
courts have the authority to allow discovery in order to 
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.37 Rule 
8(a)(1), however, serves a screening function: only those 
plaintiffs who have provided some basis to believe 
jurisdiction exists are entitled to discovery on that issue.38 
                                              
36 Of course, where the unincorporated association is the 
proponent of diversity jurisdiction, there is no reason to 
excuse it of its obligation to plead the citizenship of each of 
its members. See, e.g., Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. 
Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2010); 
Barclay Square Properties v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n of Minneapolis, 893 F.2d 968, 969 (8th Cir. 1990).  
37 See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 
& n.13 (1978); Johnson, 724 F.3d at 340 n.1; Emerald 
Investors Trust, 492 F.3d at 208.  
38 See, e.g., Baer v. United States, 722 F.3d 168, 177 (3d Cir. 
2013) (affirming a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal and the denial of 
jurisdictional discovery because the appellant had not 
adequately alleged subject-matter jurisdiction under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act). Moreover, although Rule 8(a)(1) 
does not appear to govern the pleading of personal 
jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 7; Caribbean Broad. 
Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C., 148 F.3d 1080, 1090 
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Stirling Homex Corp. v. Homasote Co., 437 
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The corollary of this principle is that a plaintiff need not 
allege an airtight case before obtaining discovery.  
 
 Depriving a party of a federal forum simply because it 
cannot identify all of the members of an unincorporated 
association is not a rational screening mechanism. The 
membership of an LLC is often not a matter of public 
record.39 Thus, a rule requiring the citizenship of each 
                                                                                                     
F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1971), our decisions in the personal-
jurisdiction context also support the notion that jurisdictional 
discovery is not available merely because the plaintiff 
requests it. In Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance 
Pharma SA, for example, we required sufficient allegations of 
personal jurisdiction in order to prevent “a fishing expedition 
. . . under the guise of jurisdictional discovery.” 623 F.3d 147, 
157 (3d Cir. 2010). 
39 Indeed, many cases note the absence of publicly available 
information regarding the membership of LLCs. See Carolina 
Cas. Ins. Co., 741 F.3d at 1087; Rooflifters, LLC v. Nautilus 
Ins. Co., No. 13 C 3251, 2013 WL 3975382, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 1, 2013); WMCV Phase, LLC v. Tufenkian Carpets Las 
Vegas, LLC, No. 2:12-cv-01454-RCJ, 2013 WL 1007711, at 
*3 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2013); Pinson v. 45 Dev., LLC, No. 
2:12-CV-02160, 2012 WL 4343494, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 
21, 2012); Chesapeake Louisiana, LP v. Creamer Prop. 
Mgmt., LLC, Civil Action No. 09-cv-0370, 2009 WL 653796, 
at *1 (W.D. La. Mar. 11, 2009); Ypsilanti Cmty. Utils. Auth. 
v. MeadWestvaco Air Sys., LLC, No. 07-CV-15280, 2008 WL 
2397651, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2008); see also Carter G. 
Bishop & Daniel S. Kleinberger, Limited Liability 
Companies: Tax and Business Law ¶ 1.03(3)(b)(ii)(A), 1998 
18 
 
member of each LLC to be alleged affirmatively before 
jurisdictional discovery would effectively shield many LLCs 
from being sued in federal court without their consent. This is 
surely not what the drafters of the Federal Rules intended.  
 
 Moreover, the benefits of such a stringent rule would 
be modest. Jurisdictional discovery will usually be less 
burdensome than merits discovery, given the more limited 
scope of jurisdictional inquiries.40 It seems to us that in 
determining the membership of an LLC or other 
unincorporated association, a few responses to interrogatories 
will often suffice. So long as discovery is narrowly tailored to 
the issue of diversity jurisdiction and parties are sanctioned 
for making truly frivolous allegations of diversity, the costs of 
this system will be manageable.  
 
 We are not the only Court of Appeals to take this 
position. The Ninth Circuit confronted facts remarkably 
similar to ours in Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. v. Team 
Equipment, Inc.41 Carolina Casualty Insurance Co., a citizen 
of Iowa and Florida, filed a diversity action seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it was not liable under one of its 
insurance policies. Two of the defendants were LLCs, but 
                                                                                                     
WL 1169338 at *29. The problem is compounded if the LLC 
(or other unincorporated association) has members that are 
themselves unincorporated associations, or even many layers 
of such members. See Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420. 
40 See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 
288, 303 (3d Cir. 2004). 
41 741 F.3d 1082. 
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Carolina did not allege the citizenship of their members. 
When the district court dismissed the complaint sua sponte 
for lack of jurisdiction, Carolina filed a motion to alter or 
amend the judgment and submitted a proposed amended 
complaint.  
 
Carolina advised the court in its moving papers 
that it was unable to determine the citizenship 
of the LLCs, because their organizational filings 
did not list their members. As a result, Carolina 
alleged simply that the members of the LLCs 
were “citizens of neither Iowa nor Florida.” . . .  
Carolina explained in its motion . . . that it had 
made efforts to determine the citizenship of the 
two LLCs . . . but it was unable to do so from 
publicly available information. The business 
filings that Carolina submitted to the district 
court show[ed] that information necessary to 
determining the citizenship of the LLCs could 
not be determined from the public filings of 
those companies.42 
The district court denied the motion, holding that the 
proposed amended complaint suffered from the same 
jurisdictional defect, among others.  
 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[t]he 
novel issue presented by this case is how a plaintiff may 
allege diversity jurisdiction where the facts supporting 
                                              
42 Id. at 1085, 1087. 
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jurisdiction are not reasonably ascertainable by the 
plaintiff.”43 It observed that “Carolina made a showing that at 
least some of the information necessary to establish the 
diversity of the parties’ citizenship was within the defendants’ 
control.”44 And it concluded that, under these circumstances 
and “at this early stage in the proceedings, a party should not 
be required to plead jurisdiction affirmatively based on actual 
knowledge.”45 Accordingly, it held that “it was sufficient for 
Carolina to allege simply that the defendants were diverse to 
it” and that “Carolina should have been permitted to plead its 
allegations on the basis of information and belief.”46 
 
 The decision of the Ninth Circuit is consistent with our 
view that a plaintiff need not affirmatively allege the 
citizenship of each member of a defendant LLC if it is unable 
to do so after a reasonable investigation.47 If the plaintiff is 
                                              
43 Id. at 1087. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 But see Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 
F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing Underwood and 
other authorities for the proposition that “[t]he citizenship of 
each member of an unincorporated association must be 
alleged” and rejecting as “mere guesswork” the plaintiff’s 
allegations that unknown John Doe defendants were not 
citizens of its state of citizenship). Otherwise, we are not 
aware of any Court of Appeals decision that expressly rejects 
the argument Lincoln Benefit makes here—that where the 
21 
 
able to allege in good faith that the LLC’s members are not 
citizens of its state of citizenship, its complaint will survive a 
facial challenge. 
 
D. The Sufficiency of Lincoln Benefit’s Allegations of 
Diversity 
 
 Lincoln Benefit’s allegations satisfy this standard. 
Taken together, the complaint and opposition to the motions 
to dismiss indicate that Lincoln Benefit has a good-faith basis 
for alleging that the LLC defendants’ members are not 
citizens of Nebraska.  
 
 We will exercise our discretion to consider what 
Lincoln Benefit said to the District Court in opposition to the 
motions to dismiss. Normally, “[i]n reviewing a facial attack, 
the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint 
and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff.”48 Affidavits and briefs 
in opposition do not fall in this category. But Lincoln Benefit 
could have amended its complaint to include the information 
                                                                                                     
membership of a defendant association is not reasonably 
ascertainable, the plaintiff is excused from identifying each 
member of that association. 
48 Gould Elecs. Inc., 220 F.3d at 176. 
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contained in those documents,49 and we have the authority to 
permit such amendment on appeal.50  
 
 The information provided by Lincoln Benefit indicates 
that (1) the LLC defendants have connections to New York 
and Delaware; (2) counsel for Lincoln Benefit conducted a 
reasonable inquiry to determine the membership of the LLC 
defendants but found nothing of value; and (3) counsel for 
Lincoln Benefit found no connection between the LLC 
defendants and Nebraska. On the basis of this information, 
Lincoln Benefit alleges that none of the LLCs’ members are 
citizens of Nebraska.  
 
 It is certainly possible that two LLCs organized and 
based in New York and Delaware have at least one member 
domiciled in Nebraska. This scenario is not so 
overwhelmingly likely, however, that Lincoln Benefit’s 
allegation to the contrary can be considered frivolous, 
especially when there is no indication that either LLC has any 
ties to Nebraska.  
 
 Lincoln Benefit has alleged complete diversity in good 
faith, and this is enough to survive a facial attack. If 
defendants mount a factual challenge to jurisdiction on 
                                              
49 We do not fault Lincoln Benefit for failing to move to 
amend. Given the District Court’s opinion, it would have 
been futile to add this information to the complaint. 
50 See 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (“Defective allegations of jurisdiction 
may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate 
courts.”). 
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remand, however, the District Court must permit 
jurisdictional discovery in order to ascertain whether 
complete diversity exists. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order dismissing the complaint and remand for 
further proceedings.  
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom FUENTES and ROTH, 
Circuit Judge join, concurring.  
As we are unanimous in the Court’s opinion, we are as 
well in this concurrence urging the Supreme Court, when 
defining the citizenship of limited liability companies (LLCs), 
to return to the path it started to mark for unincorporated 
business organizations in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 
U.S. 476, 480 (1933).  In its more recent punt to Congress of 
all questions relating to the citizenship of business 
associations, the Court recognized that it laid down a rule 
“unresponsive to policy considerations raised by the changing 
realities of business organization.”  Carden v. Arkoma 
Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 196 (1990).  As Congress has not 
accepted the invitation of the Court to craft a workable law of 
business citizenship, the latter should step into the breach. 
There is no good reason to treat LLCs differently from 
corporations for diversity-of-citizenship purposes.  A 
corporation is an entity that exists in law for the benefit of its 
owners—shareholders.  Principal features of corporations 
include limited liability, access to equity markets, and the 
directors’ fiduciary obligations of care and loyalty to 
stockholders.   
An LLC—an entity owned by members often referred 
to as unitholders—is in most respects similar to a corporation.  
Among the primary differences are that there are far fewer 
statutory default rules for LLCs (for example, “[t]he 
Delaware statute does not provide any manager or member 
standards of conduct [with respect to fiduciary duties] and 
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instead defers to the operating agreement,” Wayne M. Gazur, 
The Limited Liability Company Experiment: Unlimited 
Flexibility, Uncertain Role, 58 L. & Contemp. Probs. 135, 
151 (1995)), and an LLC can elect to be taxed as a 
partnership or a corporation. 
What do these differences have to do with diversity of 
citizenship?  Nothing.  The kinds of business activities that 
can be carried on by LLCs are identical to those in which 
corporations may engage.  6 Del. Code § 18–106.  And by 
picking corporate-style default rules in a membership 
agreement, an LLC could function in exactly the same way as 
a corporation for all purposes except diversity of citizenship.   
Just as treating LLCs as citizens of every state of 
which its members are citizens defies logic, it also takes the 
wrong lesson from our experience of assigning citizenship to 
business organizations.  Under Bank of United States v. 
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86, 91–92 (1809), 
corporations were citizens of each state where each 
stockholder was a citizen.  By 1844, the Supreme Court 
recognized the impracticality of that rule and held that a 
corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated.  
Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 
558 (1844).  That rule remained unchanged until 1958 when 
Congress added in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) that corporations are 
also citizens of their principal places of business.  See 
Carden, 494 U.S. at 196.    
Carden, where the Supreme Court held that 
unincorporated associations are citizens of the states where 
their members are citizens, came down in 1990, when LLCs, 
then a creature of only some states’ laws, languished in “near 
obscurity.”  Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of 
the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, 
Corporations, and LPs, 25 Fordham J. Corp. & Financial L. 
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459, 460 (2010).  At the time of Carden, the Internal Revenue 
Service’s ruling that an LLC could be taxed as a partnership 
was just two years old, see Rev. Ruling 88-76, and it was not 
until 1996 that every state had an LLC law.  Just as when 
Deveaux was decided in 1809, the Court in 1990 could not 
have predicted the unwieldiness of its rule.  But since the turn 
of the millennium, LLCs have become the dominant vehicle 
for doing business in the United States, and LLC formation 
outpaces corporation formation by a wide margin.  See, e.g. 
Chrisman, supra, at 460.  We need a Letson for the LLC era, 
and we urge the Supreme Court to write it. 
To see why it is impractical to require investigation 
into the citizenship of every member of any LLC, consider 
trying to sue Linn Energy, LLC, in federal court for a state-
law violation.  As of the last available information we 
reviewed, Linn is traded on the NASDAQ exchange, has a 
market capitalization of $902 million, and has 355.2 million 
outstanding units.  The LLC is 40% owned by insiders; the 
remaining membership is dispersed.  Approximately 240 
institutional unitholders combine to own a mere 10% of the 
company.  To identify Linn’s citizenship, we need to know 
the citizenship of all those unitholders, many of which are 
undoubtedly LLCs themselves with their own unwieldy 
structure—and we still have 50% of the units to account for.  
Would it not make more sense simply to ask where Linn was 
formed (Delaware) and where its principal place of business 
is located (Texas)? 
The Court opened the door to a sensible understanding 
of corporate citizenship, one that would not require discovery 
and time-consuming inquiries into corporate structure, in 
Russell, when it analyzed the sociedad en comandita, an 
unincorporated business association formed under the laws of 
Puerto Rico.  Although the Court noted the difference 
between legal personality in the common and civil-law 
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contexts, it took a functional approach to deciding whether a 
business form was a juridical person and thus had citizenship 
in the place it was formed (as opposed to borrowing its 
citizenship(s) from its members).  The Court wrote: 
In the law of its creation, the sociedad is 
consistently regarded as a juridical person. It 
may contract, own property, and transact 
business, sue and be sued in its own name and 
right. . . .  It is created by articles of association 
filed as public records.  Where the articles so 
provide, the sociedad endures for a period 
prescribed by them, regardless of the death or 
withdrawal of individual members.  Powers of 
management may be vested in managers 
designated by the articles from among the 
members whose participation is unlimited, and 
they alone may perform acts legally binding on 
the sociedad. Its members are not primarily 
liable for its acts and debts, and its creditors are 
preferred with respect to its assets and property 
over the creditors of individual members, 
although the latter may reach the interests of the 
individual members in the common capital. . . .  
These characteristics under the Codes of Puerto 
Rico give content to their declaration that the 
sociedad is a juridical person. That personality 
is so complete in contemplation of the law of 
Puerto Rico that we see no adequate reason for 
holding that the sociedad has a different status 
for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a 
corporation organized under that law.  In neither 
case may nonresidents of Puerto Rico, who 
have taken advantage of its laws to organize a 
juridical entity for the purpose of carrying on 
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business there, remove from the insular courts 
controversies arising under local law. 
Russell, 288 U.S. at 481–82 (citations omitted).  Replace 
“sociedad” with “LLC,” and “Puerto Rico” with any state 
under which an LLC is formed, and none of the opinion’s 
logic is lost. 
The law of citizenship for unincorporated associations 
receives frequent criticism.  Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 360–61 & n.28 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing 
Christine M. Kailus, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and 
Unincorporated Businesses: Collapsing the Doctrinal Wall, 
2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1543; Debra R. Cohen, Limited Liability 
Company Citizenship: Reconsidering an Illogical and 
Inconsistent Choice, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 269 (2006); Robert J. 
Tribeck, Cracking the Doctrinal Wall of Chapman v. Barney: 
A New Diversity Test for Limited Partnerships and Limited 
Liability Companies, 5 Widener J. Pub. L. 89 (1995)).  We 
add that the criticism is apt: there is no reason to treat LLCs 
differently from corporations merely because their organic 
statutes have some distinctions and they are subject to 
different tax regimes.  Despite some cracks in Carden’s 
wall—circuit courts are divided over how to determine the 
citizenship of trusts, and some circuits treat professional 
corporations, which function much like LLCs, as traditional 
corporations, see Wright, Miller, et al., 13F Fed. Prac. & 
Proc. § 3630.1 (3d ed. 2015))—it remains a formidable 
bulwark against a coherent policy with respect to the 
citizenship of LLCs.  We thus urge the Supreme Court to 
bring back Russell’s approach. 
